Communism and Confucianism In The New Age of Chinese Politics - Professor Daniel Bell
Professor Daniel A. Bell is Professor, Chair of Political Theory with the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong. He served as Dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University (Qingdao) from 2017 to 2022.
He specialises in Comparative Political Theories, focusing on Confucianism and Legalism.
His books include The Dean of Shandong (2023), Just Hierarchy (co-authored with Wang Pei, 2020), The China Model (2015), The Spirit of Cities (co-authored with Avner de-Shalit, 2012), China’s New Confucianism (2008), Beyond Liberal Democracy (2007), and East Meets West (2000), all published by Princeton University Press. He is also the author of Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford University Press, 1993).
Bell’s latest book, The Dean of Shandong, is an insider’s perspective of Chinese academia and China’s political system.
Chapters
00:00 Intro
00:50 The Reality of Chinese Academia
06:05 Political Meritocracy As An Alternative Ideal
11:02 Why Scale Matters In Politics
16:30 Corruption and Governance in China
23:20 Legalism in Practice
24:43 The Influence of Confucianism in Chinese Politics
32:58 Marxism in Chinese Politics
43:19 The Myth of The One Man Rule
51:14 China's PR Problems
56:12 Future of Meritocracy and Democracy in China
01:00:04 Critique Of Cuteness
01:04:56 Cultural Insights: Canada vs. China
01:08:49 The Spirit of Hong Kong
01:10:30 Advice for Graduates Entering the Workforce
01:13:03 Where To Find Prof Bell
Keith Yap 00:00
One of the first questions I had when I was reading your most recent book, The Dean of Shantung, was about your comparison between Western and Chinese academic environments. Most people assume that in China it's all censorship with no academic freedom, but you seem to have a different view and different lived experience.
Daniel Bell 00:24
While there is censorship and increased censorship in mainland China, I don't want to deny that. However, there are many areas with tremendous intellectual engagement and argumentation. In Confucianism, for example, there are diverse and heated debates. Recently, there was an influential article arguing that sex robots are ideal from a Confucian perspective, which prompted furious reactions from Confucian feminists.
This exemplifies how debates that don't touch on high-level politics can and do flourish. These discussions often address issues that wouldn't be of great interest to people outside China, where traditions like Confucianism aren't widely studied.
There's also less concern about politically correct terminology. While this may be changing with the new U.S. administration, many Western academics have felt they're treading on eggshells when discussing issues related to sex or race. In China, there's less of this informal censorship.
In my book, The Dean of Shandong, I began by listing everything wrong with China because you have to express those views to get to what you really want to say. There's an informal censorship mechanism where you can easily be labeled a China apologist. So you must first acknowledge China's human rights abuses before people will listen.
Even in academia, if you want to publish in a periodical and don't use the language of authoritarianism to describe the Chinese political system, it's very hard to get published. Fortunately, publishing in book form allows more freedom and original thinking in the Anglophone world.
Another key difference is China's strong commitment to serving the community. The idea that you would do your work, especially in humanities or social sciences, completely separate from contributing to the community's good is less common in China. This has roots deeper than the political system – it connects to Confucian ideas that the best life involves serving the community.
This varies by field, time period, and region. Hong Kong, for instance, is closer to the Western system where you're rewarded almost exclusively for your publishing record in leading academic journals and university presses. Whether you contribute to the community is almost completely irrelevant for hiring and promotion. However, Hong Kong has more academic freedom than mainland China. It's similar to Singapore, where you can generally do and say what you want, as long as it's not about the local government.
Keith Yap 04:33
I think in Singapore in recent years there's been an opening up of spaces for critiques to enter the public fora.
Daniel Bell 04:40
I agree. My first job was at NUS in Singapore from '91 to '94. Those days weren't ideal for academic freedom. But when I wrote The China Model, I spent a semester in Singapore because it was very hard to address politically sensitive issues in China in a balanced academic way. Singapore offered great libraries in English and Chinese and almost complete academic freedom. Singapore has improved tremendously since then.
Keith Yap 05:15
Regarding The China Model, you've challenged the assumption that we should compare governments between democracy and autocracy, with liberal democracy being the clearly superior alternative. Why do you think that's a false dichotomy?
Daniel Bell 05:35
The labels are too vague. Democracy means selecting political leaders through free and fair competitive elections, usually involving liberal values like rule of law, separation of powers, and protection of individual rights. It's also normative, suggesting that system is better than the alternatives.
Both democratic and authoritarian labels encompass such diverse forms of government that they're not very useful for classifying the political world. When I first worked in Singapore, it was labeled in the West as an authoritarian government – the same label used to describe North Korea and Saudi Arabia, which are completely different systems.
To understand China's political system, we must first understand its motivating ideals, then consider how those ideals are realized in practice and how to reduce the gap between ideal and reality. Having spent my previous life in Canada and the UK, I was somewhat brainwashed by the view that only one legitimate political system exists – one that selects leaders through free and fair competitive elections, with associated freedoms. I carried that baggage with me to Singapore.
It took a long time to adjust, and maybe I didn't even adjust well in Singapore. It wasn't until I spent eight years at Tsinghua University in Beijing that I realized my colleagues were focused on different questions: How do we train, select, and promote leaders with above-average ability and virtue? How do we measure ability and virtue? What's the relationship between them?
I realized this way of thinking has such a long history, both as an ideal and as an institution in China. I use the label "political meritocracy" – in Chinese, "xian lang zheng zhi." (贤良政治) I wrote The China Model to make sense of that ideal, show its advantages and disadvantages, and suggest ways to reduce the gap between ideal and reality.
Daniel Bell 07:35
It's a highly imperfect political meritocracy, just as democracy in the U.S. would be considered a highly imperfect democracy. We need to understand the underlying idea, its advantages and disadvantages, and ways to reduce the gap between ideal and reality. I wouldn't have conceived this question had I not spent years at a university in Beijing with future leaders.
In Singapore, despite spending three years there, it was a shock to my political system. It was difficult to shed this dogmatic view that Singapore's political system was fundamentally illegitimate because it didn't match the ideals I had learned since childhood. Now I think Singapore is also a political meritocracy – imperfect, but probably the closest to the ideal of any political system in the world.
I have great admiration for many of the leaders you've interviewed on your podcast, like Kishore Mahbubani. When I was in Singapore, I knew Goh Keng Swee and admired him immensely. Yet even that didn't change my dogmatic view that there was only one legitimate form of government, and it wasn't Singapore's.
Keith Yap 09:56
So regarding political meritocracy, what would be the ideal version in your mind as to how it should manifest itself in government?
Daniel Bell 10:12
Scale matters for politics. It's more important to have democratic mechanisms in smaller political communities. This is an old point made by philosophers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I had an enlightening experience in Singapore that illustrated this. I greatly admired George Yeo and was disappointed when he lost his election.
Shortly after, I was in a taxi in Singapore, discussing this with the driver. The driver agreed that Yeo was outstanding but said he didn't vote for him because "he didn't come to my father's funeral." This made me realize that such personal connections only matter in small political communities. In China, President Xi couldn't attend everyone's funeral.
In a large community like China, at different levels of government, there are different ways of selecting and promoting leaders. Through interviews with leaders, including the head of the Organization Department which handles leadership selection, I learned that different abilities matter at different levels.
At lower to mid levels, democratic mechanisms are more important – seeing how leaders have support from people and serve their local community. At mid to higher levels, governance becomes more complex. Leaders need to think about policies affecting huge numbers of stakeholders, not just the local community, but the entire country, future generations, and international relations. This requires knowledge of economics, international relations, philosophy, history, and environmental science, plus a track record of good political judgments.
The underlying system in China aims to have democratic systems for selecting leaders at lower levels, becoming progressively more meritocratic at higher levels. Between these extremes, there's room for experimentation. Part of China's success comes from innovation in how they select and promote leaders at mid-levels of government.
Daniel Bell 13:40
For higher-level positions, leaders need above-average analytical ability because the issues are complex and require knowledge of many disciplines. One thing you can say about the Chinese political system, similar to Singapore, is that the leaders at higher levels are typically quite brilliant.
But politics isn't like academia where you can succeed just by staying in your office reading books or conducting experiments. In politics, you spend much time dealing with stakeholders, requiring good people skills or EQ. It's very hard to get through the system without those skills.
Most importantly, leaders must show virtue – a willingness to serve the community rather than misuse public resources for personal or family interest. In other words, don't be corrupt. The Organization Department, which is like the world's largest human resources department, assesses these skills. While highly imperfect and constantly experimenting, this system is fundamental to understanding Chinese politics.
Keith Yap 15:14
When you talk about political meritocracy in practice, drawing from economists like Yuan Yuanang, China has been meritocratic for the most part. If you think about someone like Bo Xilai, he did help propel Chongqing to a more prosperous state. The problem they face is the issue of endemic corruption.
Daniel Bell 15:40
When I began as dean at Shandong University, the premier university in a province of 100 million people, it was at the height of the anti-corruption campaign. We had to have small offices, including the party secretary whose office was next to mine. We had to record every dish ordered at meals, with no alcohol allowed at public expense. These measures made it complicated to spend money and made people, including me, more conservative and less innovative than we might have been.
This isn't a very original point, but from my experience, excessive legalist means of dealing with corruption makes public officials risk-averse and unwilling to consider new challenges. This isn't good for the country's long-term future.
The anti-corruption campaign also affected trust-building. In Shandong province, which has high per capita alcohol consumption, meals and drinking are traditionally viewed as ways to build trust. Much of that ended with these strict measures, making people more atomized and individualistic.
Things are changing somewhat now – there's less fear of punishment, and the rules have relaxed. You don't have to record every dish, and beer is allowed on public expense. But there's still a long way to go. Ultimately, there needs to be less reliance on fear of punishment and more on other mechanisms, including higher salaries like in Singapore, though China as a relatively poor country can't match Singapore's salary levels. Moral self-regulation is important, and this is where the Confucian tradition has much to add.
Keith Yap 18:59
As you spoke about legalism, you mentioned in your book your run-in with the law. That was an interesting anecdote about how the government implemented harsh measures through legalism, and then over time started using softer means like Confucianism where you were pushed to self-regulate through moral means.
Daniel Bell 19:24
That's right. It shouldn't be unfamiliar to Singapore, which was known as the "fine city," but now relies less on fines because people have internalized behaviors like not jaywalking or littering. It's similar in China. Legalism, meaning harsh punishment applied rigorously and uniformly without exceptions or special circumstances, might be necessary for serious problems requiring quick results.
For example, with drinking and driving in China over ten years ago, statistics showed many accidents, so the government took serious action. In Beijing, they conducted random checks, and if drivers were slightly above the limit, their cars would be temporarily confiscated and driving privileges suspended for six months. This happened to me, and it worked – I never drove after drinking again.
Eventually, fewer checks were needed as people's views changed from legal regulation to moral self-regulation. The campaign became even stricter shortly after it began – I would have been jailed if caught a few months later. Now in Beijing, there are very few alcohol checks, yet hardly any drunk driving. They've also developed practical solutions, like a service where you can call someone to come on a bicycle and drive your car home if you've been drinking.
Keith Yap 22:30
It seems the harsh laws served as a precursor to establishing the moral culture you want in the country.
Daniel Bell 22:40
Right, but harsh laws wouldn't work if people don't know deep down that something is wrong. The real precursor is some moral belief that what you're doing is wrong, but it just doesn't affect behavior. Then legalist measures can come in to reinforce that.
Keith Yap 23:15
It's like spitting in Singapore. We all knew we shouldn't do it, but people used to spit a lot on the streets. Now pretty much no one does it and no one really gets fined for it anymore.
Daniel Bell 23:18
Exactly, or littering, or flushing toilets, or whatever.
Keith Yap 23:31
So far we've talked a lot about legalism, but we also see that Confucianism informs a lot of Chinese political philosophy. Could you illuminate how Confucianism today informs Chinese politics?
Daniel Bell 23:53
Confucianism is a very rich and diverse tradition. At its core, it views the good life as nourishing humane and harmonious social relations. While this might sound trivial, there are other views of the good life, such as a religious life separate from community or family. For Confucians, the best possible life is serving the community as a public official because that's how you can do the most good once you have political power.
Again, this might sound obvious, but many disagree. Some religious ideals advocate separation from the community. In Plato's Republic, the best life involves seeking truth, with serving the community as a second choice. Confucians say the best life is serving the community, and to do that, you must be committed to constant self-improvement within a mechanism that selects and promotes public officials based on superior ability and virtue.
Keith Yap 25:40
This ideal has had huge influence in the Chinese political system throughout history, most famously institutionalized through the imperial examination system. More recently, this ideal has been revived during China's economic reform period, where public officials are selected according to their ability – measured through experience and success at lower levels of government – and virtue, meaning avoiding corruption and showing willingness to serve the community.
People say China has had economic reform but no political reform. But what does that mean? The political system is completely different from what it was during the Cultural Revolution. Now there's a very strong institutionalized and complex bureaucratic system aiming to select and promote public officials with superior ability and virtue. Though highly imperfect and in constant flux, it's there, motivated by this ancient Confucian ideal of political meritocracy.
This isn't distinctly Confucian either – the Mohists arguably had a similar view. Even the legalists cared about ability, though not virtue. Shang Yang, who influenced the first emperor of China, suggested measuring merit by counting severed heads of enemy soldiers – a very objective measure. The legalists were skeptical about virtue, thinking it was all hypocrisy. But Confucians insisted on both ability and virtue, with ability meaning more than just military success but serving the community effectively.
Confucian values affect the political system in very concrete ways. In Qufu, the home of Confucian culture in Shandong province, public officials' promotion depends partly on their filial piety. They literally interview candidates' parents – if elderly parents say their child isn't filial, it negatively affects their promotion chances. This would be unthinkable in Canada. But in China, if people can't show reverence and care for their own parents, it's considered difficult for them to extend that care beyond family.
Additionally, becoming a public official requires getting into a good university through the Gaokao (高考) examination system, which includes studying Confucian classics. Students must learn and interpret passages from Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi.
Sometimes Confucian influence comes from the bottom up. The Grave Sweeping Festival became a national holiday because tens of millions of workers would take the day off to pay respect to their ancestors. The government eventually formalized what was already happening.
Keith Yap 30:02
Lee Kuan Yew gave a public lecture about shi nong gong shang (士农工商) , where the scholar is seen as the highest vocation that one should strive for as the ideal life. So in China's political life, it seems the best and most virtuous people should strive to become politicians. This contrasts with America, where the country's culture emulates capitalists, with talent concentrating in the capitalist sector. What do you think of that view?
Daniel Bell 30:49
I think that's right, but remember China is a very diverse country. The Confucian influence is stronger in Shandong province and related areas. In the South, there's much more of an entrepreneurial spirit, closer to the ideal that success means making money.
This manifests in very concrete ways. In most of China, especially the South, the lucky number is eight because it sounds like "making money." You see it on license plates and phones. But in Shandong province, the lucky number is seven. There's a saying, "at qi shang ba xia"(七上八下) – if you're 57 in government, you still have hope for promotion, but at 58, you're on the way down. At my university, an office with number seven would be more prestigious than one with eight.
Keith Yap 32:08
This brings me to my next question about the influence of Marxism in Chinese politics today. Most Western commentators and media have a crude view, equating communism with suppression and lack of political rights. What would be the more nuanced view?
Daniel Bell 32:32
The communist tradition is diverse, though arguably quite new and less diverse than Confucianism. Marx's original vision of communism identified capitalism's problem as capital being owned by capitalists while workers must work to make money – work becomes a means to life rather than life's prime want. The goal was moving toward a society where workers aren't forced to work as a means to life.
How? By developing the economy so advanced machinery does the socially necessary work, meeting people's basic needs and freeing them to realize their creative talents. This requires going through a capitalist process – Marx's theory of history – because only through capitalism can you develop technology effectively, as capitalists must compete to make profit through improving technology.
The byproduct of capitalism is increased technology and better machinery. Eventually, according to Marx, capitalism can be overthrown, moving toward a communist system where technology is owned by the people, machines do necessary work, and people are free to realize their creative talents.
Daniel Bell 38:36
Now in China, Marxism is making a comeback because there's an optimistic view about AI. If managed and regulated for social benefit, several decades from now we might achieve the possibility where advanced machinery does the socially necessary, dirty, dangerous, repetitive work, freeing people to realize their creative talents. This is one reason why Marxism is being revived – the Marxist ideal of communism seems more possible now.
Deng Xiaoping had it right: we need to go through capitalism to develop productive forces, but that's a means to an end. Eventually, we need to move toward a more communist society. This differs from the Confucian ideal of realizing ourselves through harmonious and humane social relations. For Marxists, it's through creative work that we realize our creative essence.
These ideals can conflict in practice. Once, after presenting these ideas in China, a young woman told me she feels this tension – wanting to realize herself through work while owing obligations to elderly parents, creating conflicts in time and energy that aren't easily harmonized.
I think both ideals are important for understanding China's political system. Historically, Marxism became the dominant ideology partly because Marx saw government's ultimate aim as providing for people's material well-being. The Confucians had this view long ago – even Mencius said people need stable property or basic material needs before they can be moral. You can't be moral if you're always struggling for necessities.
Throughout Chinese history, governments have focused on dealing with famine and poverty, long before Western governments considered alleviating poverty as a government obligation. That's one reason Marxism took hold in 20th century China.
The dark side is the Leninist view of Marxism – needing strong central organization to rule and using extreme measures to purge political opponents. This was effective in wartime, helping the communists win the civil war through stronger Leninist organization. But ruling a country in peacetime with that approach can lead to disasters, as happened after 1949.
Keith Yap 38:15
The follow-up question I had regarding Marxism was about the view that the state will fade away once you've extracted everything you can, once your machinery is so advanced. But in China, you argue that's not going to be the case – that the state will continue playing a very strong hand even in the ideal version of itself. Why?
Daniel Bell 38:36
Marx didn't anticipate several developments that are now obvious. He was optimistic about machinery and technology eventually doing socially necessary work. But he didn't anticipate that machinery could become so advanced it could dominate human beings, even posing an existential threat. With AI development, we need a strong state to regulate it, ensuring AI serves human needs and doesn't make us slaves to technology.
Similarly, Marx couldn't anticipate that technology would develop to the point where it could destroy the environment through climate change and global warming. We need a strong state to regulate that too. The same applies to nuclear weapons, pandemics – all existential threats Marx couldn't foresee.
Marx thought once we had advanced machinery and people's basic needs were met, we wouldn't need a state because its main purpose was exercising coercion for the ruling class. Without a ruling class, there'd be no need for a coercive state – it would wither away. But now we know that even with advanced machinery and social equality, we'll still need a state to prevent existential threats.
Keith Yap 40:53
So the state is really there to provide guardrails to ensure the means of production doesn't turn against you.
Daniel Bell 41:03
Yes, that's part of it. But it's not just providing guardrails – until we reach this state of higher communism where people's basic material needs are met through advanced machinery, we need an active state to ensure technology serves people rather than the other way around.
There's a tendency to think one person decides everything in the Chinese political system. In 2012, China faced three major challenges: rampant corruption threatening the political system, a huge rich-poor gap from rapid economic growth causing resentment, and catastrophic environmental consequences from development. These issues had to be dealt with regardless of who was in charge.
That's more or less what happened since 2012 – more emphasis on reducing corruption, income inequality, and promoting environmental sustainability. The current leader is first among equals. The Politburo Standing Committee was changed from nine leaders to seven, making it easier to tackle vested interests blocking necessary changes. This probably would have happened regardless of who was number one.
Keith Yap 45:29
I would say they've made tremendous progress on those three issues. Even when I visited this past year, you could see the widespread electrification of vehicles and improved air quality in major urban cities within just ten years. In 2012, people probably couldn't imagine that.
Keith Yap 45:55
The offshoot of that question would be: looking at Chinese politics, to many outsiders and Western media, it's very opaque. China hasn't been able to translate itself to be sufficiently intelligible to the outside public because they've been so focused on communicating inwards. What are some examples where China hasn't translated itself well to the outside world?
Daniel Bell 46:25
It's related partly to the political system and the anti-corruption campaign. The downside of the anti-corruption campaign is that it makes public officials more conservative and risk-averse. To communicate persuasively to people outside China, you can't just say what's great about China – that sounds like empty propaganda. You need to acknowledge problems and portray China in a more realistic and humane way.
But because of this conservatism in the political system, journalists or academics who try to portray a more balanced picture often run into problems with censorship or authorities. This is recognized privately, even within government, but especially at mid-tier levels, public officials remain very risk-averse.
Even with my recent book, The Dean of Shandong, I tried to show the humanity and humor among public officials and bureaucrats in a balanced way. I got permission from certain officials, but because it's not wholly positive, it hasn't been accepted for publication in mainland China – though it has in Hong Kong, showing Hong Kong's greater academic freedom.
That said, things are improving. Recently, we've seen the phenomenon of "TikTok refugees" moving to Xiaohongshu, the Chinese app. With easy online translation, there's more communication of China's humanity and humor, including problems, which actually does more to promote China's soft power than official attempts to show only the good side.
Keith Yap 50:03
There's also the idea of having proper naming conventions. You've pointed out that they often don't try to promote a softer image overseas or maybe aren't too familiar with linguistic differences.
Daniel Bell 50:24
A clear example was the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony, where they chose the character "He"和 (harmony) to represent Chinese culture. I remember watching on NBC, and the commentators were saying, "Look at this Chinese harmony," pointing to soldiers marching in unison. They said it was scary to have everyone thinking and acting the same way.
But anyone who knows Chinese and Confucius knows that "he" means diversity in harmony rather than sameness or uniformity. The Chinese idea of harmony includes a love of diversity. The metaphors used express this clearly: a soup with only salt won't taste good – you need many ingredients. Music with one note is boring – you need many notes. In politics, this idea was explicitly used to show that a ruler who only listens to one political view will never find out what's wrong and be able to correct it.
Just getting translations right would prevent misunderstandings. The central idea of "he" in Chinese culture should be translated as "diversity in harmony" to prevent misinterpretation.
Keith Yap 52:37
Over the years, the government has changed ministry names to refresh itself. For example, we have Singapore's equivalent to the Ministry of Communication and Information, which would now be the Ministry of Digital Development and Information because of the digital dimension in information transmission.
Daniel Bell 53:01
Some translations of government ministry names are problematic. The Xuanquanbu (宣传部) was originally translated as "propaganda," now "publicity," but that sounds pejorative – "communication" would be more neutral. Or Tongzhanbu, (统战部) "united front" – in wartime, this referred to the communists and Kuomintang uniting against Japan. Now this wartime terminology isn't appropriate and should be changed to reflect new realities.
Even the party secretary role, especially at lower levels of government, isn't mainly about making people follow the party line. In universities, they spend most time smoothing out human relations and handling non-academic work. Western universities don't have party secretaries, which means less censorship, but having someone in charge of social problems can be valuable.
For instance, at Shandong University, we had a serious car accident, and the party secretary had to comfort the parents. We could call them "harmony secretaries." This function, stripped of political censorship, might be worth learning from. Interestingly, with the huge increase in psychotherapy in Chinese history, many therapists were formerly party secretaries because they were skilled at handling human conflict and harmonizing relations.
Keith Yap 55:22
You wrote an interesting essay about how China will look in 2050, painting a vision where meritocracy and democracy could complement each other, with wider political participation while maintaining competent public officials. What would that look like for a more meritocratic and democratic China?
Daniel Bell 55:47
Well, it's hard to know – that essay was quite speculative and involved some humor. The ruling organization now has about 100 million people, maybe 120 million in 20-30 years. That's a huge organization with necessary internal diversity. There's room for much more democracy within the ruling organization.
How to institutionalize this without leading to open conflict and factions is important, but it can't be constantly suppressed. When you talk to people off the record in China, once you have trust, you get very open conversations. There's strong recognition of the need for more democracy within the ruling organization, so all party members have some say in the political system, less top-down than now.
This could take different forms. There could be sortition where people are randomly selected within the ruling organization, as it's already a quality check, to have some say in policy making. There might be more electoral mechanisms and deliberation within the ruling organization.
For those outside the ruling organization, it's important to have lasting legitimacy for the whole political system. This could be implicit or take different forms – perhaps some future AI allowing consultation among the people, or a referendum giving the party 30 years of ruling time, long enough to make decisions affecting future generations and train people for the long term, dealing with issues like climate change without worrying about elections every few years. But after 30 years, there would be some check on the system.
Among intellectuals in China, almost anyone under 50 favors more freedom of speech – it's almost the only thing uniting liberals, socialists, and Confucians. So there could be more freedom of speech, more ways of organizing politically and making voices heard, while recognizing the ruling organization makes final decisions on big issues. That's one way of combining stronger democratic mechanisms with a meritocratic system.
Keith Yap 59:14
What is your critique of cuteness?
Daniel Bell 59:16
It's really odd on the face of it, but East Asian cultures with Confucian heritage share this culture of cuteness – cute animals in social media, emojis. While this exists elsewhere, not to the same extent. Even as a bureaucrat, I would use emojis and happy faces when communicating with other bureaucrats. When I showed my social media to a professor at a leading U.S. university, he laughed and said they definitely don't have this.
The good side of this culture of cuteness is that it softens otherwise hard-edged communication. The downside of meritocracy, very evident in Singapore, is that it creates a hyper-competitive society where people are ambitious and afraid of losing face. This culture of cuteness rebels against that – it's saying we don't care, we just want to enjoy ourselves. It's like a Taoist carefree way of life, counterbalancing the hyper-competitive, ambitious side.
Not coincidentally, it started in Japan with teenage girls developing this culture of cuteness that spread to other countries with Confucian heritage. The downside is when public officials use cuteness to evade responsibility or make jokes when they should be making hard decisions. Take Boris Johnson – I found him very charming, and I'd love to have dinner with him, but when it came to making decisions, he was horrible, evading responsibility and lying.
I saw that flaw in myself as Dean. Sometimes I made jokes and tried to be cute to avoid responsibility and hard decisions. That's the downside of this culture of cuteness.
Keith Yap 1:02:11
In Singapore, we see politicians using social media more to endear themselves rather than communicate policy stances. They follow dance trends and show their official trips. Even in recent American elections, marketing runs on personality more than policy.
Daniel Bell 1:02:55
On the other hand, it's okay for public officials to show their human side, as long as it doesn't take too much time away from thinking about policies that benefit people, and isn't used to evade responsibility and hard decisions.
Keith Yap 1:03:15
You have to find the golden mean – be appropriately cute.
Daniel Bell 1:03:16
Right. Goh Keng Swee had that. He was charming and cute in private, besides being brilliant and creative. I wish I'd taken notes during our meals to tell stories. I just remember being so charmed by him.
Keith Yap 1:03:43
That's what people remember of him as well - privately charming, but much more serious and stale in public.
Daniel Bell 1:03:50
So probably he had the golden mean because you have to take hard decisions, and he certainly didn't let his cuteness get in the way of that.
Keith Yap 1:03:58
You're Canadian yourself and also in China. What's the best part about China and Canada you wish more people knew about?
Daniel Bell 1:04:06
For Canada, there are two lovely parts. First is Montreal, where I'm from. It's a cool and creative city that's also safe, combining order and harmony with love of diversity. It's super creative and bilingual. Like Singapore, most people speak two languages. In Montreal, almost everybody is perfectly bilingual in French and English. Bilingualism lets you imagine yourself through other people's perspectives more easily, leading to more empathy and compassion. The downside is the very cold winter - I haven't been back in winter for many years.
The other part is ice hockey - in Canada we just call it hockey. It's hardly well known elsewhere, but it's such a beautiful sport combining grace and beauty with power. If you like sports, which I do, hockey is the sport that best combines gracefulness with power. There's strong emphasis on passing and deferring to others. Even when you interview hockey players, they're almost Confucian, putting themselves down and saying they're doing everything for the team. Currently, the Montreal Canadiens is perhaps the most exciting young team in hockey.
As for China, it's really a continent, not a country. The differences aren't just between city and rural areas, which are completely different worlds, but between cities too. People in Shanghai and Beijing are very different and often dislike each other. I wrote a book called The Spirit of Cities with my co-author Avner de-Shalit from Jerusalem, trying to articulate some of this. Even within Shandong province, the differences between Jinan and Qingdao are huge.
This diversity within China isn't well known outside. There's also the humanity and humor of everyday life. People think of the political system and politicians who are often deadly boring and stern, but in everyday life and mid-levels of bureaucracy, as I tried to show in my latest book, there's so much humanity and humor that's important to communicate to the rest of the world.
Keith Yap 1:07:54
If there was a spirit of Hong Kong today, what would it look like?
Daniel Bell 1:07:59
Hong Kong is fascinating because it's committed to capitalism - it's in the basic law. Inside a communist country, there's this celebration of making money which can often take ugly forms. Hong Kong has a huge gap between rich and poor, with half the people living in public housing that's terrible compared to Singapore's. The downside of capitalism is very clear.
But you also have this social order. There's a saying that if you drove a Rolls Royce in the poorest parts of the U.S., you'd get rocks thrown at your window. But in Hong Kong's poorest areas, people would admire a gold Rolls Royce. There's this odd respect for wealth, which is quite powerful in Hong Kong.
But it's moderated by a Confucian ethos. Hong Kong didn't go through the revolution which attempted to destroy Confucianism. So everyday family life is very much informed by Confucian ethics and its commitment to serve the family and community, expanding love and care from family to outsiders. This moderates capitalism's excesses. That's how I would articulate Hong Kong's ethos.
Keith Yap 1:09:36
What advice do you usually give to your graduates as they enter the workforce?
Daniel Bell 1:09:40
My students are very diverse. Confucius was a teacher of teachers, with a wonderful model of teaching where he would give contradictory advice to different students depending on their needs and interests. There's no general advice - I need to know the student in all their glorious individuality.
But if there's one general point: the future is absolutely uncertain. The only certainty, if we're lucky enough to avoid war that destroys humanity, is rapid technological and social change. When I was in university, we thought once you found a job, that was it until retirement. Now, especially in Singapore, which is probably doing better than anywhere else at preparing students, there's a need for constant learning and readiness to do completely different things throughout your life.
Keith Yap 1:10:59
Actually, in that light you taught me two lessons. You taught me the right frame to read the Lunyu (论语), the Analects, which is not to take a general view but to appreciate the individual context of each text.
Daniel Bell 1:11:12
It's Confucius and his students, and each student is different. You have to think of it like a play and have background knowledge. He deliberately only says part of what he thinks is correct when teaching students, hoping they'll develop the rest on their own. It's important to understand who the students are, their interests, and what they're famous for in subsequent Chinese history.
This is why the Gaokao is problematic - students must memorize parts of classic texts, including the Analects, and learn the "correct" interpretation. Confucius would be shocked because there's no single correct interpretation. Some are better than others, but interpretations change over time based on new knowledge, new challenges, and who's interpreting in what context. Understanding this is important to make sense of and enjoy the text.
Keith Yap 1:12:14
With that, where can we find your work?
Daniel Bell 1:12:15
My latest book is The Dean of Shandong: Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat at a Chinese University. It tries to show the humanity and humor while drawing implications from my experiences as dean.
The China Model is more academic, discussing systematically what political meritocracy is, its advantages and disadvantages, and how to reduce the gap between ideal and reality in the Chinese setting.
Just Hierarchy, co-written with Wang Pei, my colleague and wife at the University of Hong Kong, shows that any modern society needs hierarchies. We know which ones are bad - based on race, sex, or class - but which ones are good and why? We theorize about that with many examples. These books are available in the usual places, like Amazon.
Keith Yap 1:13:15
Thank you, Prof, for coming on.
Daniel Bell 1:13:18
Thank you for this engagement. I love your podcast and watched the whole one about Dr. Goh Keng Swee, which was wonderful. I look forward to more of your podcasts and to learning more. Thank you.